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THE SELLING OUT OF MOUNT LAUREL:
REGIONAL CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS IN
NEW JERSEY'S FAIR HOUSING ACT
Rachel Fox*
I.

Introduction

After years of inaction on the issue of exclusionary zoning, the
New Jersey Legislature enacted the Fair Housing Act in July of
1985.1 Previously, exclusionary municipal zoning ordinances were
monitored exclusively by the courts pursuant to litigation challenging
these ordinances. 2 Under the Fair Housing Act (the Act), the Council
on Affordable Housing (the Council) replaced the courts as the
initial arbiter in exclusionary zoning cases. 3
In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel (Mount Laurel ]),4 the New Jersey Supreme Court established
a rule-now known as the Mount Laurel doctrine-that requires
municipal land use regulations to provide for the construction of
low and moderate income housing.' Eight years later, in a rehearing
of the same case (Mount Laurel IJ),6 the New Jersey Supreme Court
"put some steel" into its earlier unheeded decision. 7 The court set
up a system under which adversely affected parties could seek substantial revision of zoning ordinances so as to provide for the building
of low and moderate income housing.
* Associate, Mitchell, Silberberg & Knitpp, Los Angeles, California. B.A.,
1983, Brandeis University; J.D., 1988, Harvard Law School. I wish to extend special
thanks to Professor Duncan Kennedy of Harvard Law School and Martin S. Fox.
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1987).
2. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel II]; Pascack
Ass'n v. Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977); Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977); Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert.
denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel 1].
3. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-316 (West 1987).
4. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S.
808 (1975).
5. See id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724-25.
6. See Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
7. See id. at 200, 456 A.2d at 410.
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The Mount Laurel II court envisioned the abolition of exclusionary
zoning as a means of accomplishing three goals. First, it would
provide housing for the poor. Second, it would cause the racial and
economic integration of New Jersey's municipalities. The consequence
of these two goals would be the deconcentration of the urban poor,
which would lead to the third goal: the rejuvenation of New Jersey's
economy. 8
The Fair Housing Act essentially codified the Mount Laurel Doctrine as it existed after the Mount Laurel II decision. 9 The Act
provided the means by which municipalities may fulfill their Mount
Laurel II obligations. 10 Rather than eliminating exclusionary zoning,
however, the Fair Housing Act, through its provision for Regional
Contribution Agreements (RCAs), allows this practice to continue
so long as each excluding municipality pays for the construction of
low and moderate income housing somewhere within a certain radius
of its borders. The RCA provisions permit municipalities to trade
away up to fifty percent of their low income housing obligations
through agreements with other municipalities that have greater low
income populations." By permitting far less integration than the
Mount Laurel I & II courts had intended, the RCA provisions
deviated from the original Mount Laurel doctrine: they compromised
the goal of racial and economic integration for the goal of constructing low and moderate income housing.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently upheld RCAs as "facially"
constitutional in Hills Development Co. v. Bernards Township (Mount
Laurel 111).12 The court, however, left open the possibility of state
constitutional challenges to the Council's implementation of RCAs
where such implementation violates certain basic goals of the Mount
Laurel doctrine. 3

8. See id. at 208-14, 456 A.2d at 415-18.
9. The Fair Housing Act reiterates the Mount Laurel doctrine requirement that
"every municipality in a growth area has a constitutional obligation to provide
through its land use regulations a realistic opportunity for a fair share of its region's
present and prospective needs for housing for low and moderate income families."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-302(a) (West 1987) (citing Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Mount
Laurel 11, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983)).
10. See infra notes 55-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mount
Laurel II obligations.
11. See infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of RCAs.
12. 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986) [hereinafter Mount Laurel III]. See infra
notes 102-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
13. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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Despite the Mount Laurel III court's deviation from the original
Mount Laurel Doctrine, the court did not retreat from the basic
goals of that doctrine. If properly implemented, RCAs could further
Mount Laurel's goal of rejuvenating New Jersey's economy by providing housing directly to those municipalities most in need. As
implemented by the Council, however, the RCAs continue to thwart
the basic goals of the Mount Laurel doctrine and do not meet the
constitutional standards set forth in Mount Laurel III. The loosely
regulated RCA bidding process fails to insure that the transferred
housing will be fairly distributed to inner-city areas with the greatest
need for low income housing. The present bidding process also
threatens the actual construction of transferred housing by creating
the potential for misuse of RCA funds. Moreover, as implemented
by the Council, the RCAs hinder even the relatively limited racial
and economic integration envisioned by the court in Mount Laurel
IlI.
Part II of this Article outlines the origins of exclusionary zoning,
the Mount Laurel doctrine and RCAs. 14 Part III discusses Mount
Laurel's implicit goal of racial integration. 5 Part IV argues that,
as implemented by the Council on Affordable Housing, RCAs thwart
the Mount Laurel doctrine's explicit goal of revitalizing urban areas
and its implicit goal of racial integration of suburban municipalities. 16
In addition, Part IV proposes various alternatives to the unregulated
bidding process that will enable the Fair Housing Act (the Act) to
achieve the. goals of the Mount Laurel doctrine more effectively. 7
Part V concludes that, because the RCAs thwart some of the basic
goals of the Mount Laurel doctrine, the Act can no longer be
described as a codification of that doctrine and substantial revisions
are required to harmonize the Act, as currently implemented, with
the Mount Laurel vision.
II.

Background: Evolution of the Mount Laurel Doctrine

This section discusses the concept of exclusionary zoning and New
Jersey's judicial and legislative attempts to alleviate its ill effects
through implementation of the Mount Laurel doctrine.

14.
15.
16.
17.
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infra

notes
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Exclusionary Zoning

In the years following World War II, massive migration of New
Jersey's upper income residents from its cities to its rapidly developing
suburbs led suburban municipalites to employ the practice of exclusionary zoning to prevent the influx of low income residents.' 8
Requirements of minimum lot sizes and minimum floor areas, which
limit the availability of land, restricted residence in these municipalities primarily to upper income people.'9 The municipalities' authority to zone, their tax structure 2° and their concern with maintaining
the character of their communities 21 are all factors that contributed
to exclusionary zoning.
The movement of industry and commerce to the suburbs galvanized
a concomitant shift of blue-collar jobs away from the cities. 22 Zoning
ordinances worked to encourage the movement of tax-generating
businesses to the suburban areas and discourage the development

18. See McDougall, The Judicial Struggle Against Exclusionary Zoning: The
New Jersey Paradigm, 14 HnAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 625, 626-28 [hereinafter
McDougall]. As one commentator has noted:
Following World War II, a variety of forces combined to create a massive
wave of suburbanization around northeastern cities. The suburbs offered
less expensive land which allowed the employment of new technology.
It was also believed that tranquil surroundings would encourage stability,
contentment and higher productivity among the workforce.
Id.at 625.
19. See Mount Laurel 1,67 N.J. 151, 171, 336 A.2d 713, 723, cert. denied
and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
20. In New Jersey, municipal governments have the power to zone real property
and to finance public services provided to their residents with taxes on real property.
See McDougall, supra note 18, at 628.
21. At the time of Mount Laurel 1, suburban municipal leaders feared social
and racial tension more than the financial costs associated with suburban integration.
See Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 196, 336 A.2d at 736-37 (Pashman, J., concurring).
"Many people who settle in suburban areas do so with the specific intention of
living in affluent, socially homogeneous communities and of escaping what they
perceive to be the problems of the cities." See id. at 196, 336 A.2d at 737 (Pashman,
J., concurring) (citations omitted). Preservation of the social structure of the
community ultimately includes a financial motive as well: homeowners want to
protect their investments in expensive homes by avoiding a decrease in property
values that would inevitably occur if the urban poor were allowed to move in.
Ironically, racial or economic prejudice on the part of these homeowners is arguably
the primary reason for the fall in property values that results when the poor move
into the community.
22. See Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 206, 336 A.2d at 742 (Pashman, J.,
concurring). "The migration of industry attracted population to the jobs it created
in the suburbs while cities were left with a large unemployed population, in many
instances heavily black and Latin, whose need for services placed a great weight
on the municipal tax base." McDougall, supra note 18, at 626-27.
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of housing for the people who would be employed by these businesses
'23
because these people were viewed as "revenue-absorbers.
Exclusionary zoning thus led to the concentration of New Jersey's
poor in its cities. Businesses and the middle and upper classes then

began to flee to the suburbs to escape increasing urban decay. 2 This
restricted pattern of development threatened the socio-economic stability of the entire state. Crime and other problems that developed

in the urban slums spread outward to the suburbs. This "continuing
disintegration of [the] cities encourage[d] business and industry to
leave New Jersey altogether, resulting in a drain of jobs and dollars
'
from [its] economy.

25

Exclusionary zoning, by limiting the number of residential units
per acre of land, artificially maintains reduced prices for the benefit

of upper income families on land for which groups of low income
26
families would collectively pay more to live in density housing. If
a single-family homebuyer and a high density developer were given

an equal opportunity to bid for the same lot in a free market without
exclusionary zoning, the revenue that the developer would stand to
gain from its use of the land would likely exceed the premium placed
on exclusivity by the individual family. Therefore, except in those
instances where the individual family places an extremely high premium on exclusivity, the developer would outbid the single family.
Exclusionary zoning thus, in effect, provides a subsidy to the individual higher income family by sheltering it from competition with
developers for use of land.

23. 67 N.J. at 206-07, 336 A.2d at 742 (Pashman, J., concurring). As a result,
workers were forced to spend vast amounts of time and money commuting from
their homes in the cities to their jobs in the suburbs. This burden was exacerbated
by the lack of mass transportation along these routes. See id.
24. See Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 158, 210-11 n.5, 456 A.2d 390, 415-16
n.5 (1983).
25. Id.
26. Cf. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 608, 419 Pa. 504,
524 (1965) (land divided into one-acre lots for residential building valued at $260,000.
After a four-acre restriction was imposed upon this same land, however, the number
of available building sites decreased by 75% and the value of the land fell to
$175,000). In the absence of exclusionary zoning, a group of lower income people
would be able to outbid a higher income individual for a single piece of land.
Similarly, a developer would reap greater profits from density housing than from
single-family homes on larger lots. Although there is a possibility that, absent
exclusionary zoning, the single-family lot purchaser may pay a premium for exclusivity, it is unlikely that any such premium would bring this purchaser's bidding
price up to the level that a group of lower income residents would pay for the
same lot with density housing.
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Moreover, low income residents in density housing, in the aggregate, produce greater tax revenues per acre than upper income
residents on single-family lots. Low income residents in density
housing, however, also generate a greater burden on public services. 27

This public service burden is greater than the tax revenues received
from these low income residents. Consequently, the introduction of
density housing into a community that was previously limited to
upper income residents on single-family lots increases the taxes of
the upper income residents. 2 By prohibiting density housing, exclusionary zoning thus provides a dual subsidy to upper income families:
(1) it maintains the price of land at a level below that which low

27. There is an assumption in the Mount Laurel cases and the scholarly work
concerning the Mount Laurel doctrine that the poor have larger families. Consequently, discussion of the fiscal consequences of admitting the poor often focuses
on the burden to the tax base presented by the tremendous influx of children.
See, e.g., J. SURENLAN, Mount Laurel II AND THE FmR HOUSING ACT 5-6 (New
Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education 1987) (Mr. Surenian was a law
clerk for Judge Serpentelli, one of the three specialized trial judges appointed
pursuant to Mount Laurel I) [hereinafter SURENIAN].
In addition, wealthy families are more likely to send their children to private
schools, thereby imposing less of a burden on the public school system and, in
turn, the municipal tax base, than low income families.
It was assumed by residents of excluding municipalities that, in addition to
burdening the tax base by sending more children to public school, the poor would
bring a need for greater community crime prevention services. The construction of
density housing for the poor would require an increase in taxes to support other
infrastructure costs such as additional roads, sewers, water systems and other
municipal services. See Morris County Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Township,
197 N.J. Super. 359, 367, 484 A.2d 1302, 1306-07 (Law Div. 1984), cited in
SURENIAN, supra, at 6.
28. The largest municipal expense is the public education of children. Consequently, municipalities used exclusionary bedroom restrictions, as well as other
more explicit limitations on the number of children permitted per dwelling unit,
to exclude homes for families with several children. The zoning approvals discussed
in Mount Laurel I are an example of such exclusionary bedroom restrictions.
[The zoning approvals] require that the developer must provide in its
leases that no school-age children shall be permitted to occupy any onebedroom apartment and that no more than two such children shall reside
in any two-bedroom unit. The developer is also required, prior to the
issuance of the first building permit, to record a covenant, running with
all land on which multi-family housing is to be constructed, providing
that in the event more than .3 school children per multi-family unit shall
attend the township school system in any one year, the developer will
pay the cost of tuition and other school expenses of all such excess
numbers of children.
Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. 151, 168, 336 A.2d 713, 721-22, cert. denied and appeal
dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). This practice reflected the view that "the fewer
the school children, the low[er] the tax rate." See id. at 171, 336 A.2d at 723.
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income residents would be willing to pay; and (2) it lowers the
29
amount of taxes paid by upper income residents.

B.

The Mount Laurel Doctrine: Mount Laurel I & II

This section discusses the emergence of the Mount Laurel doctrine
in Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey Supreme Court's subsequent

retreat from this doctrine, and the doctrine's forceful reemergence
in Mount Laurel 11.
1. Mount Laurel I
In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court attacked the practice of
exclusionary zoning in Mount Laurel 1.30 The court pointed out that

any zoning ordinance that infringed upon the "general welfare" of
the people of the state of New Jersey violated both the Zoning
Enabling Act3 and the New Jersey Constitution.3 2 According to the
court, "adequate housing of all categories of people is an absolute

essential in promotion of the general welfare [which is] required in
all local land use regulation." 33 The court found that Mount Laurel's
4
exclusionary zoning practices failed to provide such housing.1
Justice Hall ordered that each developing municipality in New

Jersey must provide in its zoning regulations the affirmative opportunity for the construction of low and moderate income housing
to the extent of the municipality's "fair share" of the "regional"
need for such housing." The court, however, failed to define these
terms.3 6 Moreover, where a municipality's zoning ordinances are

29. These subsidies are arguably borne by low income families because exclusionary zoning forces greater housing densities and greater service burdens per tax
dollar on the communities to which, as a result of exclusion from other communities,
low income families are confined. Such overburdening of municipal services without
sufficient support from tax revenues inevitably reduces the quality of these services.
30. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.24 713,'cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S.
808 (1975).
31. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-30 to -51 (West 1967).
32. N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 1; see Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 175, 336 A.2d at
725.
33. Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727.
34. See id. at 151, 336 A.2d at 713.
35. Id. at 188, 336 A.2d at 732.
36. As many critics of the Mount Laurel I decision have noted, by failing to
define "fair share" and "region," and by not ordering a procedure for supervision
of municipal ordinances, Justice Hall's decision did not provide a remedy for those
adversely affected by exclusionary zoning. Moreover, insofar as the obligation to
provide housing applied only to "developing" municipalities, many communities
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designed to attract industry and other commerce, the municipality
must "permit adequate housing within the means of the employees
involved in such uses.""
In his concurrence, Justice Pashman recommended that the Mount
Laurel obligation be extended to all municipalities in New Jersey.3"
In addition, Justice Pashman advocated active judicial enforcement
of the Mount Laurel mandate39 and proposed an analysis for trial
n
courts to employ when deciding exclusionary zoning cases. 4
with significant housing needs were exempt from the Mount Laurel mandate. The
Mount Laurel II court explained the ineffectiveness of the earlier Mount Laurel I
decision in these words:
Although the [Mount Laurel 1] court set forth important guidelines for
implementing the doctrine, their application to particular cases was complex, and the resolution of many questions left uncertain. Was it a
"developing" municipality? What was the "region," and how was it to
be determined? How was the "fair share" to be calculated within the
region?
Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. 158, 205, 456 A.2d 390, 413 (1983); see also Mount
Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 208, 336 A.2d at 743 ("[tjhe majority has chosen not to
explore ... either the extent of the affirmative obligation upon developing mu-

nicipalities or the role of the courts in enforcing those obligations. It also has
chosen not to consider the degree to which the principles applicable to developing
municipalities are also applicable to rural ones and to largely developed ones");
McDougall, supra note 18, at 632 (noting shortcomings of Mount Laurel 1).
37. Mount Laurel I,67 N.J. 151, 187, 336 A.2d 713, 722, cert. denied and
appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
Justice Hall condemned the practice of valuing tax revenues more highly than
human welfare by limiting the categories of housing permitted within a municipality.
He argued that since the power of a municipality to zone, granted by the state's
zoning enabling act, derives from the police power of the state, "when [a municipal]
regulation does have a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state's citizens
beyond the borders of a particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must
be recognized and served." Mount Laurel 1,67 N.J. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726.
38. Justice Pashman wrote:
[D]eveloped suburban municipalities which have availed themselves of
the land use controls permitted by statute, and which have not provided
sufficient opportunities for development of low and moderate income
housing to meet their fair share of regional needs, have both a negative
obligation not to use zoning and subdivision controls to obstruct the
construction of such housing and an affirmative duty to plan and provide
for such housing, insofar as these obligations can be carried out without
grossly disturbing existing neighborhoods .... Occasions ... arise in

every community when land becomes available for development or redevelopment. It is on these occasions that these obligations come into
play most strongly.
Id. at 217-18, 336 A.2d at 748 (Pashman, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
39. See id.at 208-09, 336 A.2d at 743.
40. The court should: (1) identify the relevant region; (2) determine the present
and future housing needs of the region; (3) allocate these needs among the various
municipalities in the region; and (4) shape a suitable remedial order. Id. at 21516, 336 A.2d at 747.
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Although the plaintiffs in Mount Laurel I represented the black
and Hispanic minority poor, the Mount Laurel I court did not focus
directly on race as a factor in exclusionary zoning. The majority
found that the regulations were based on economic and not nec-

essarily racial discrimination because the zoning ordinances excluded
nonminority as well as minority low income people. 41 Justice Pashman, however, specifically acknowledged the possibility of a dis-

criminatory motivation behind exclusionary zoning in general, noting
that "exclusionary zoning practices are often motivated by fear of2
4
and prejudices against other social, economic and racial groups.
2. Retreat from Mount Laurel I
In two subsequent decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court limited
the Mount Laurel doctrine as set out in Mount Laurel I. In Oakwood
at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,43 the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that a developing municipality's zoning ordinances need
not determine a specific number of units that would constitute its

fair share of a particular region's need for low income housing.
Rather, zoning ordinances should "realistically [permit] the opportunity to provide a fair and reasonable share of the region's need
for housing for the lower income population." 44
41. See id. at 159, 336 A.2d at 717. "We have reference to young and elderly
couples, single persons, and large, growing families not in the poverty class, but
who still can not afford the only kinds of housing realistically permitted in most
places-relatively high-priced, single-family detached dwellings on sizeable lots and,
in some municipalities, expensive apartments." Id.
The court accepted the municipal counsel's argument that the regulatory scheme
was adopted without any specific desire or intent to exclude prospective residents
on the basis of race, origin or believed social incompatibility. See id.
42. Id. at 196, 336 A.2d at 736 (Pashman, J., concurring) (citing NAT'L COMM.
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, JOBS AND HOUSING: FINAL SUMMARY REPORT

ON THE HOUSING COMPONENT 25-29 (1972)); see also Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 562, 371 A.2d 1192, 1232 (1977) (exclusionary
zoning is also motivated by long-standing social and racial fears and prejudices)
(Pashman, J., concurring). In Oakwood, Pashman noted one study which reported
that the residents of an "all-white" suburb of Detroit chose to reject all further
federal funds for urban renewal, rather than comply with an order to provide
housing for minority residents. See id. at 562 n.4, 371 A.2d at 1232 n.4 (Pashman,
J., concurring).
Justice Pashman acknowledged, however, that there was no racial motivation
behind the ordinance at issue in Mount Laurel L See Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at
196 n.2, 336 A.2d at 736 n.2.
43. 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
44. Id. at 543, 371 A.2d at 1223. Apparently, the impetus for this decision
was the inability of the superior court to set a specific figure for the number of
housing units needed in order for Madison Township to fulfill its Mount Laurel
obligation.
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Like the Mount Laurel I court, the Oakwood court avoided clear

definitions of the terms "fair share" and "region. ' 45 In addition,
the Oakwood decision has been criticized for accepting "least cost"
housing as a substitute for low and moderate income housing. "Least
cost" housing refers to the least expensive housing that could be
built after removal of zoning restrictions." Oakwood has generally

45. The court found that precise definitions of these terms could not be formulated by the judiciary and that their formulation was more appropriately the
function of an administrative agency created by the state legislature. "Fair share"
was difficult to calculate because "numerical housing goals are not realistically
translatable into specific substantive changes in a zoning ordinance." Id. at 49899, 371 A.2d at 1200-01. "Region" would have to remain an amorphous concept
because:
[T]he breadth of approach by the experts to the factor of the appropriate
region and to the criteria for allocation of regional housing goals to
municipal "subregions" is so great and the pertinent economic and
sociological considerations so diverse as to preclude judicial dictation of
any one solution as authoritative.
Id. at 499, 371 A.2d at 1200.
The court thus adopted the vague definition of "region" set forth by the lower
court as "the area from which, in view of available employment and transportation,
the population of the township would be drawn, absent exclusionary zoning." Id.
at 537, 371 A.2d at 1219.
Instead of helping municipalities determine their fair share of the regional need
by clarifying the terms left undefined in Mount Laurel I, the court upheld Mount
Laurel I but failed to enforce it when a situation arose in which the need to do
so was clear. Justice Pashman, the strongest advocate on the New Jersey Supreme
Court of specific judicial enforcement of the Mount Laurel mandate, stated the
following:
[If the rights afforded by Mount Laurel are to have any real meaning
or value, fulfillment of the obligation must be measured in terms of
actual production of sufficiently dispersed low and moderate income
housing. Judicial relief therefore must be geared toward achieving that
goal.
Id. at 578-89, 371 A.2d at 1241 (Pashman, J., concurring & dissenting).
46. See id. at 512, 371 A.2d at 1207. "Least cost" housing is generally not
affordable to people of low income. Rather, it is available primarily to middle
income families who can not afford housing in the conventional suburban housing
market. See Mount Laurel I, 92 N.J. 158, 277, 456 A.2d 390, 451 (1983). The
Oakwood majority was sympathetic to the defendant's argument that, due to the
insufficiency of governmental subsidies for the construction of low and moderate
income housing, it was not economically feasible for private industry to construct
such housing. The court held that since zoning changes alone were not likely to
produce a substantial amount of low income housing, zoning regulations need only
make possible the construction of "least cost" housing, consistent with certain
minimum standards of health and safety, to fulfill the fair share requirement. See
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 510-14, 371
A.2d 1192, 1206-08 (1977).
Although construction of "least cost" housing may not create new units for low
and moderate income residents, it would increase the housing supply and indirectly
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47
been viewed as a retreat from Mount Laurel 1.
In Pascack Association v. Washington,48 the New Jersey Supreme
Court retreated further from the obligation set forth in Mount Laurel
I. As in Mount Laurel I, the zoning ordinance in Washington
Township did not provide for low income housing. Nevertheless,
the court upheld the ordinance, stating:

Maintaining the character of a fully developed, predominantly
single-family residential community constitutes an appropriate desideratum of zoning to which a municipal governing body may
legitimately give substantial weight in arriving at a policy legislative
decision as to whether, or to what extent, to admit multi-family49
housing in such vacant land areas as remain in such a community.
In contravention of the Mount Laurel principle that zoning by
municipalities must be for the general welfare of all the state's
citizens,50 the Pascack court focused on the use of the term "de-

provide housing to these residents through the process of "filtering down." Under
the "filtration," "filter down" or "trickle down" theory of housing, it is argued
that as new units are constructed for higher income families, previous units become
available for those residents of slightly lesser income. See generally HOUSING IN
AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 161-62 (R. Montgomery & D. Mandelker
(1979)); W. SMITH, FILTERING AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE (1964). According to
this theory, a shift occurs throughout the housing market, leaving units at the
bottom newly available for the lowest income residents in the community. "The
shorter the chain, the sooner the needs of the lowest income families are met and
presumably the better the facilities made available to them. The shortness of the
chain obviously depends on the inexpensiveness of the most recently constructed
housing." Oakwood, 72 N.J. at 515 n.22, 371 A.2d at 1208 n.22.
The filtration theory has been widely criticized for its tendency to leave low
income residents with seriously substandard housing. See, e.g., McDougall, Mount
Laurel II and the Revitalizing City, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 667, 688-91 (1984) [hereinafter
Revitalizing City]; Edel, Filtering in the Private Housing Market, in READINGS IN

204-15 (M. Edel & J. Rothenberg ed. 1972); G. Hawkins, An
Explosion Within: An Alternative Analysis to the Trickle Down Theory of Housing
Markets (1986) (on file with Professor Duncan Kennedy, Harvard Law School).
Moreover, as housing values appreciate, filtering does not provide housing for
URBAN ECONOMICS

low income residents in the suburbs. Rather, it exacerbates urban flight, leaving

most low income residents in the inner cities. See Mount Laurel I1,92 N.J. at
278, 456 A.2d at 451.
47. See generally Rose, Oakwood at Madison: A Tactical Retreat to Preserve
the Mount Laurel Principle, 13 URBAN L. ANN. 3 (1977). "The basic notion in
Oakwood at Madison, that towns are more likely to comply with a general instruction
to do something, and less likely to comply if they are told exactly what to do, is
one of those things which simply passes all understanding." Williams, The Background and Significance of Mount Laurel II, 26 J. URa. & CONTEMP. LAW 3, 17
(1984).

48. 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977).
49. Id. at 483-84, 379 A.2d at 13.
50. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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veloping municipalities" by the Mount Laurel I court and affirmed
the ordinance on the ground that Washington Township was fully
developed.'
3.

Mount Laurel II

In the unanimous decision of Mount Laurel 11,52 the New Jersey
Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles set forth in Mount Laurel
I and established a system of judicial enforcement of those principles. 3 The opinion began:

51. Once again, Justice Pashman criticized the majority's "developed/developing" distinction as contradictory to the general intent of Mount Laurel I to
require municipalities to provide for regional housing needs in their zoning ordinances. See Pascack, 74 N.J. at 503, 379 A.2d at 23 (Pashman, J., dissenting);
supra note 35. Justice Pashman advocated applying the obligation to all municipalities, recognizing that municipalities go through various stages of development
over time. See id. at 503-04, 379 A.2d at 23-24. He went on to attack the majority's
failure to define adequately the term "developing municipality" because the continued ambiguity would expand the number of communities that would escape the
Mount Laurel mandate. See id. at 505, 379 A.2d at 24. Furthermore, the label of
"developed" under this decision would reward an exemption from the Mount Laurel
doctrine to any municipality that was able to exclude low income residents until
all of its land was developed, thereby encouraging discriminatory zoning in such
communities. Moreover, the remaining communities in the region would have a
larger "fair share" burden as a consequence. See id. at 505-06, 379 A.2d at 24.
52. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983). Mount Laurel II resolved six consolidated
cases involving challenges to municipal zoning ordinances. See id. at 199 n.1, 456
A.2d at 410 n.1.
53. The Mount Laurel II court set up a system whereby a special master,
appointed by the trial court, would help municipal officials revise a zoning ordinance
that had been found by the trial court to violate the Mount Laurel doctrine. See
id. at 281, 456 A.2d at 453. The defendant-municipality would have to submit a
revised ordinance within 90 days of the judgment of noncompliance. If the new
ordinance was still in violation of Mount Laurel, the court would order remedies,
such as forced acceptance by the municipality of a court-ordered ordinance or
delays in construction of other projects in the municipality until its zoning ordinance
was in compliance. See id. at 281-90, 456 A.2d at 453-58.
The Mount Laurel II court, expressing its desire to cut down on Mount Laurel
litigation, ordered that there would be just one trial and one appeal in Mount
Laurel cases. See id. at 218, 290, 456 A.2d at 420, 458. Once a municipality was
found to be in compliance, the determination would have res judicata effect for
six years, giving the municipalities a six-year period of repose. See id. at 291-92,
456 A.2d at 458-59. The court held that compliance judgments would have res
judicata effect for six years "despite changed circumstances," but added in a
footnote that "a substantial transformation of the municipality . . . may trigger a

valid Mount Laurel claim before the six years have expired." Id. at 291, 292 n.44,
456 A.2d at 459, 459 n.44. Note that this period of repose has more resistance
to changed circumstances than the res judicata doctrine normally would provide.
See Chall, Housing Reform in New Jersey: The Mount Laurel Decision, 10 FED.
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This is the return, eight years later, of [Mount Laurel I]....
[T]en years after the trial court's initial order invalidating its
zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel remains blatantly afflicted with

a blatantly exclusionary ordinance. Papered over with studies,
rationalized by hired experts, the ordinance at its core is true to

N.Y. Q. REV. 19, 22 n.12 (Winter 1985-1986) [hereinafter Chall].
Mount Laurel II not only ordered judicial enforcement of the Mount Laurel
doctrine, but specifically delineated judicial remedies for parties challenging exclusionary zoning ordinances. The court expanded the use of the "builder's remedy"
created in Oakwood. The "builder's remedy" is the court-ordered issuance of a
building permit to a developer-plaintiff who successfully challenges the validity of
a zoning ordinance under the Mount Laurel doctrine. See Oakwood, 72 N.J. at
548-51, 371 A.2d at 1226-27. Whereas the Oakwood court discouraged the use of
the builder's remedy except in rare cases, Mount Laurel H held that a builder's
remedy should be granted in all cases where a proposed development contained
"substantial" low income housing, unless the municipality could establish that the
development would conflict with sound land use concerns. See Mount Laurel 1H,
92 N.J. at 279-80, 456 A.2d at 452-53.
The court suggested that a proposed development would have a "substantial"
amount of low income housing if 20%o of the units would be designated for low
income residents. See id. at 279 n.37, 456 A.2d at 452 n.37. Thus, a developer
would be granted the right to invalidate a zoning ordinance affecting its land and
to build at higher densities if: (1) it proved either that the ordinance is facially
invalid or that the municipality has failed to provide its fair share of low income
housing; (2) it showed that its proposed development would include a substantial
number of low income units; and (3) the municipality failed to establish that the
proposed development contradicted sound planning or threatened the environment.
See id. at 279-80, 456 A.2d at 452-53.
The builder's remedy was designed to motivate municipalities to provide their
fair share of low income housing on a voluntary basis. If a municipality were to
satisfy its housing obligation through mandatory set-asides, it could select where
the low income housing would be constructed as well as the set-aside percentagethat is, the ratio between lower and higher income units to be constructed. By
contrast, the grant of a builder's remedy enables the builder to construct the density
housing wherever the land happens to be located. Moreover, since the Mount Laurel
H court recommended a 200o set-aside ratio for proposed developments in the
builder's remedy context, a community may be forced to absorb a greater number
of housing units than it would were it voluntarily to enter into an agreement with
a builder and arrange for a different set-aside percentage.
Under a builder's remedy, a municipality is forced to accept four market rate
units for every low income unit a developer proposes to provide. The Mount Laurel
H court, however, cautioned developers that the builder's remedy was not to be
used as a threat or "bargaining chip in a builder's negotiations with the municipality," and that the remedy would be awarded in such a way as to assure that
low income housing would in fact be constructed. See id. at 280-81, 456 A.2d at
452-53. Developers who have no intention of building low income housing and are
unable to secure building permits would not be able to benefit from the builder's
remedy. The builder's remedy was intended to benefit all parties adversely affected
by exclusionary zoning. As one commentator has noted, the builder's remedy
"attempts to give developers common interests with civil rights groups, making
them willing to bear costs of litigation that the latter groups can not afford."
Chall, supra, at 19, 22-23.
RESERVE BANK
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nothing but Mount Laurel's determination to exclude the poor.
Mount Laurel is not alone; we believe that there is widespread
noncompliance with the constitutional mandate of our original
opinion in this case.
To the best of our ability, we shall not allow it to continue.
The court is more firmly committed to the original Mount Laurel
doctrine than ever, and we are determined, within appropriate
4
judicial bounds, to make it work.1

The Mount Laurel II opinion emphasized the need for the eradication of exclusionary zoning in order to revitalize New Jersey's
cities and its overall economy. 5 Accordingly, Justice Wilentz created

54. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 198-99, 456 A.2d at 409-10. The court was
determined to "put some steel" into the Mount Laurel doctrine, commenting
throughout its lengthy opinion that the nonresponsiveness of the state legislature
to widespread exclusionary zoning forced the judiciary to enforce the constitutional
obligation of Mount Laurel I. The court noted that "it has traditionally been the
judiciary, and not the [Ilegislature, that has remedied substantive abuses of the
zoning power by municipalities" in New Jersey. Id. at 213 n.7, 456 A.2d at 417
n.7.
The issue of whether the Mount Laurel II court remained "within appropriate
judicial bounds" in crafting cures for exclusionary zoning has provoked a considerable controversy. See, e.g., Tarr & Harrison, Legitimacy and Capacity in State
Supreme Court Policymaking: The New Jersey Court and Exclusionary Zoning, 15
RUTGERS L.J. 513 (1984) (discussing arguments against judicial activism by state
courts). One commentator wrote:
[Aire the detrimental consequences of exclusionary zoning sufficiently
antisocial, evil, and uncivilized, and the causal relationship sufficiently
clear for the judiciary to override the decisions of those branches of
government which have express constitutional policymaking authority?
Or, is the extent of the harmful consequences, when compared to alternative urban policies, sufficiently debatable to withhold judicial intervention?
Rose, New Additions to the Lexicon of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 14 SETON
HALL L. REV. 851, 887-88 (1984) (exclusionary zoning is not a suitable area for
judicial intervention since its consequences are not as harsh as those of a "holocaustal" policy) [hereinafter Rose].
55. See Mount Laurel 11,92 N.J. 158, 211 n.5, 456 A.2d 390, 415 n.5 (1982).
The court explained that:
The provision of lower income housing in the suburbs may help to relieve
cities of what has become an overwhelming fiscal and social burden. It
may also make jobs more accessible for the unemployed poor. Deconcentration of the urban poor will presumably make cities more attractive
for businesses and upper income residents to return to ....

The damage done by urban blight and decay is in no way confined
to those who remain in our cities. It affects all of us. Violent crime
and drug abuse spawned in urban slums do not remain within city limits,
they spread out to the suburbs and infect those living there. Efforts to
combat these diseases require expenditures of public dollars that drain
all taxpayers, urban and suburban alike. The continuing disintegration
...
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a framework to achieve this goal. First, the court directed that every
zoning ordinance provide a realistic opportunity for "decent housing"
for the municipality's present indigenous poor living in dilapidated
or overcrowded housing, "except where they represent a dispro6
portionately large segment of the population," as in urban areas.1
Where a municipality, usually an urban area, has a greater concentration of inadequately housed poor than the surrounding region,
those municipalities containing "growth" areas must provide housing
for a portion of the lower income municipality's poor residents.
Second, Mount Laurel II rejected the Oakwood proposition that
a general intent or good-faith attempt in a zoning ordinance to
provide low and moderate income housing would be adequate. Rather,
the court held that a municipality must "in fact [provide] a realistic
opportunity for the construction of its fair share of low and moderate
income housing .
".$..8
Compliance with the Mount Laurel mandate
would require both a specific numerical fair share of units set out

of our cities encourages businesses and industry to leave New Jersey
altogether, resulting in a drain of jobs and dollars from our economy.
In sum, the decline of our cities and the increasing economic segregation
of our population are not just isolated problems for those left behind
in the cities, but a disease threatening us all.
Id.
56. See id. at 214-15, 456 A.2d at 418. One commentator criticized this "disproportionately large segment" limitation on the obligation to provide housing for
indigenous poor, cautioning that it may encourage cities to seek exemption from
the Mount Laurel mandate. See Revitalizing City, supra note 46, at 676.
57. See Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 226-27, 456 A.2d at 424-25. The existence
of a "growth area" is determined by several criteria, including:
(1) location within or adjacent to major population and/or employment
centers; (2) location within or in proximity to existing major water supply
and sewer service areas; (3) location within or in proximity to areas
served by major highway and commuter rail facilities; (4) absence of
large concentrations of agricultural land; and (5) absence of large blocks
of public open space or environmentally-sensitive land.
SURENIAN, supra note 27, at 173.
58. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 221, 456 A.2d at 421-22. The court defined
"moderate income families," "low income families" and "affordable housing" as
follows:
'Moderate income families' are those whose incomes are no greater than
80% and no less than 50076 of the median income of the area, with
adjustments for smaller and larger families. 'Low income families' are
those whose incomes do not exceed 50% of the median income of the
area ....
... [Affordable housing] mean[s] that the family pays no more than
2556 of its income for such housing...
Id. at 221, 456 A.2d at 421.
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in the ordinance and a "likelihood ...
[would] actually be constructed." 5 9

that the lower income housing

59. Id. at 222, 456 A.2d at 422. Decisions following Mount Laurel I have
construed its "realistic opportunity" requirement "as requiring a ...

theoretical,

rather than realistic, opportunity for low income housing: a municipality had merely
to remove from its zoning regulation any restriction against the building of such
housing." 92 N.J. at 260, 456 A.2d at 442. The Mount Laurel II opinion emphasized
that the Mount Laurel doctrine requires a municipality to remove such barriers
and to take affirmative steps to provide a realistic opportunity for the construction
of its fair share of the regional need for low and moderate income housing.
Recognizing that satisfaction of the Mount Laurel doctrine can not depend on
the inclination of developers to help the poor, the court delineated two types of
affirmative measures which a municipality might take. First, municipalities could
encourage or even require the use of available state or federal housing subsidies.
Second, municipalities could employ inclusionary zoning techniques. See id. at 26277, 456 A.2d at 443-51.
"Inclusionary zoning" includes incentive zoning, such as sliding scale density
bonuses and fixed bonuses for participation in low income housing programs, as
well as mandatory set-asides. See id. at 266-74, 456 A.2d at 443-49. See generally
R. Wn.LAMS, ON

THE INCLINATION

OF DEVELOPERS TO HELP THE

POOR (Lincoln

Institute of Land Policy, Policy Analysis Series No. 211, 1985) [hereinafter WmLIAMS]; Ellickson, The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167
(1981); Fox & Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low and Moderate Cost
Housing, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015 (1976). A "sliding scale density bonus"

increases the permitted density as the amount of low income housing provided is
increased. See Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445. A "density
bonus" reduces the land price per unit of housing by permitting a developer to
build more units per acre than otherwise allowed under the municipality's zoning
ordinance. See WILLIAMS, supra, at 12.
The "mandatory set-aside" is the chief device used by municipalities to bring
SURENIAN, supra note 27, at 300. In a
mandatory set-aside program, a municipal developer must construct a mandatory
percentage of low income units within its development. The set-aside percentage
is determined by the municipality. Id. at 301. Since the low income units are
typically made available at prices well below the cost of their construction, most
mandatory set-aside programs include density bonuses as a compensating precaution
against the possibility of a challenge by a developer to the straight set-aside program
as an unconstitutional taking of property. See WaLIAM, supra, at 15. "Where it
can be asserted, however, that there exists no legislatively-vested right to develop
land, then the issuance of the building permit itself may be argued as adequate
compensation, thus avoiding the takings issue." Id.
The Mount Laurel II court directed municipalities and courts to order the phasein of lower income units while other units in a development were being built. Thus,
municipalities could avoid the problem of a developer completing the higher income
units and then failing to fulfill the obligation to provide the lower income units.

their regulations into compliance. See

See Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 270, 456 A.2d at 447.
Mandatory set-asides with density bonuses as a means of subsidizing the construction of low income housing is problematic because it requires a community
to accommodate a much greater number of housing units in fulfilling its fair share
obligation than it would have to if sufficient government subsidies were available.
For example, a municipality found to have an obligation of 200 low income units
could be forced to accept 1000 new units under a 2007 set-aside program in order
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Third, the court rejected the "developing municipality" language
of Mount Laurel I, which had enabled many municipalities classified
as "developed" to avoid the Mount Laurel obligation. 60 The Mount
Laurel II court extended the obligation to every municipality that
encompassed any land characterized by the State Development Guide
Plan (SDGP) as a "growth" area. 61 In addition, the court overruled
the Pascack decision. Although the extent of development in a
municipality would be a factor in determining the size of the municipality's Mount Laurel obligation and the timing of its implementation, the obligation would still exist for fully developed
municipalities, including built-up suburbs and central cities. 62
Fourth, the court moved to fill the gap left by Mount Laurel I
in its failure to define "fair share" and "region. ' 63 The court adopted
and designed a special court
the Oakwood definition of "region"
to hear all Mount Laurel litigation. 65 Over time, this system would
reveal a consistent pattern of regions. The major factor to be
determined in Mount Laurel litigation would then be a particular
municipality's fair share of that regional need. 66 The court required

to get the 200 units built. While 800 higher income units will generate tax revenues,
1000 new units may burden the municipal infrastructure beyond its capacity. Moreover, the creation of 1000 new units would have a far more noticeable impact on
the character of the community than would 200 new units. However, because the
Mount Laurel II court could not allocate state funds to subsidize the construction
of the low income units, the court was left with inclusionary zoning techniques as
the primary means of accomplishing construction of the units.
60. See, e.g., Pascack Ass'n v. Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977).
See notes 48-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
61. See supra note 57 for a definition of "growth area." The court emphasized,
however, that the State Development Guide Plan (SDGP) should not be "the
absolute determinant of the locus of the Mount Laurel obligation" because the
legislature did not design it for this purpose. Nonetheless, the cases where the locus
of the Mount Laurel obligation differed from the "growth area" as determined
by the SDGP would be rare. See Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 239, 456 A.2d at
431.
62. See id. at 240-48, 456 A.2d at 431-35. See supra notes 36, 51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's past treatment of the "developed/
developing" distinction.
63. See supra notes 35-36, 45 and accompanying text.
64. The Oakwood court defined "region" as "the area from which, in view
of available employment and transportation, the population of the township would
be drawn, absent exclusionary zoning." See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
65. See Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 253, 456 A.2d at 438-39. Three judges,
each to be chosen by the Chief Justice and approved by other members of the
New Jersey Supreme Court, would hear all Mount Laurel litigation. See id.
66. In determining fair share, the court endorsed the use of statewide growth
plans developed by agencies such as the Department of Environmental Protection,
plans formulated by Qounty planning boards, and population projections developed
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that the fair share determinations apportion among low and moderate
income housing needs.
Fifth, the Mount Laurel II court circumscribed the adequacy of
"least cost" housing to fulfill a Mount Laurel obligation. Since it
benefits primarily middle rather than moderate or low income families, least cost housing is sufficient only in situations where the
municipality has removed excessive zoning barriers and exhausted
other measures to reduce building costs, yet land prices remain high
67
enough to prohibit the construction of low income housing.
Finally, the court allowed for phase-in programs if the number
of units needed would have too radical an impact on community
services.68 In addition, limits on municipalities' fair share determinations would be allowed if construction of the full number of new
units based on regional need would require diminishing environmental
land reserves or would adversely affect the environment in some
other way. 69 Under Mount Laurel H, once a municipality had
fulfilled its Mount Laurel obligation, it would be free to zone areas
70
for upper income housing, or in accordance with fiscal obligations.
Such zoning regulations would not be void under the Mount Laurel
doctrine once the municipality provided for its fair share. 7'
As in Mount Laurel I, the Mount Laurel H court did not directly
consider race as an element of exclusionary zoning. Despite Justice
Pashman's comments on racism and exclusionary zoning in Mount
Laurel I and Oakwood,72 the only mention by the Mount Laurel II
court of race as a factor in exclusionary zoning was a reference,
buried in a long footnote, to a finding by the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders that suburban exclusionary zoning
was a principal reason why the United States was developing into
two societies, "one black, one white-separate and unequal. ' 73

by agencies such as the Departments of Transportation and Energy. The court
expressed a preference for fair share formulas that give "substantial weight to
employment opportunities in the municipality, especially new employment accompanied by substantial ratables." Id. at 256, 456 A.2d at 440.
67. See id. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451.
68. See id. at 219, 456 A.2d at 420.
69. Id. "No forests or small towns need be paved over and covered with highrise apartments as a result of today's decision." Id.
70. See id. at 259-60, 456 A.2d at 442.
71. The regulations could be voided for other reasons, however, such as a
failure to bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental goal. See id.
72. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
73. Mount Laurel 1H, 92 N.J. at 210 n.5, 456 A.2d at 415 n.5 (citing REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (U.S. Gov't Printing
Office 1968)).
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The Fair Housing Act and Regional Contribution Agreements

Following the Mount Laurel II decision, the specialized trial courts
processed exclusionary zoning cases expeditiously and imposed large

fair share burdens on municipalities, thus encouraging municipalities
to comply voluntarily with the Mount Laurel mandate. 74 As a result,
municipalities could no longer avoid compliance by litigating indefinitely in an effort to outspend plaintiffs who had challenged
their zoning ordinances. 75 These municipalities began to put pressure
on the Governor and the state legislature to enact legislation that

76
would reduce the number of fair share units imposed by the courts.

In exchange for protection against exclusionary zoning litigation,
the Fair Housing Act (the Act), 77 enacted on July 2, 1985, supplanted
the Mount Laurel II enforcement mechanisms with new procedures
by which municipalities may voluntarily fulfill the requirements of
the Mount Laurel doctrine.
1.

Major Provisions of the Act

The Act established the Council on Affordable Housing (the Coun7
cil) to determine the fair share housing obligations of municipalities. 1

74. See SURENIAN, supra note 27, at 12-13.
75. Objections to the threat of the builder's remedy, as well as to the mandatory
set-aside for its onerous construction ratios that forced cities to accommodate several
market units for each low income unit a developer provided, also fueled this political
pressure. See id. at 14-15.
76. See id. at 13. In the Minority Statement on the Fair Housing Act, the
Republican minority criticized the specialized trial courts for the size of the housing
burdens they were imposing on exclusionary municipalities. See id. at 13-14 (citing
Fair Housing Act, Minority Statement (1985)).
77. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1988).
78. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307 (West 1988). The Council is empowered to:
(1) define housing regions; (2) estimate the present and prospective need for low
and moderate income housing at the state and regional levels; (3) adopt guidelines
for municipalities to determine their fair share of the regional housing need and
methods of adjusting and phasing in their fair shares; (4) provide population and
housing projections; and (5) place a limit on the aggregate number of units a
municipality may be required to build. See id.
The Department of the Public Advocate has objected to the substantive regulations
of the Council for its failure to insure the initial and continued affordability and
availability of low income housing. The regulations make purchase prices "affordable" only for those families exactly at the 50076 and 80% of median income
levels, and "almost three-fourths . . . of all low income households in New Jersey
have incomes less than 3507o of the median." S. Eisdorfer, Initial Comments by
the Department of the Public Advocate Upon the Proposed Regulations of the
Council on Affordable Housing 4-6 (June 30, 1986) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office) [hereinafter Eisdorfer]. Due to
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A 1987 amendment to the Council's regulations sets the maximum
fair share obligation at 1000 units for a single municipality.7 9 The
Act further provides that municipalities may phase in their fair share
obligations, but they may also be required to phase in other development simultaneously so as to maintain a balance between the
construction of low income units and other development.8 0

financing problems encountered by low income families, rental housing is the only
realistic option for most of these families, and the regulations do not require
housing plans to include rental housing. Moreover, the resale price controls extend
for only 20 years. See id. at 8-10.
Despite the Mount Laurel II court's rejection of the filtration theory, the Council's
housing allocation methodology, set forth in their regulations, assumes a downward
filtration:
[The Council's housing allocation methodology] substantially reduces the
total unmet lower income housing need by positing that downward filtration will produce a net addition to the housing stock between 1987
and 1988 of approximately 50,000 safe, decent units affordable to lower
income households. It is the single largest downward adjustment to the
gross need figure proposed by the regulation.
Id. at 12.
Mr. Eisdorfer goes on to illustrate how filtration does not work. Destruction,
abandonment and conversion to other uses decreased the low income housing market
in Newark by more than half between 1964 and 1981. See id. at 13-14 (citing
BURCHELL, THE NEW REALITY OF MUNICIPAL FINANCE: THE RISE

AND

FALL OF

THE

INTERGOVERNMENTAL CITY 145 (1985)). Finally, Mr. Eisdorfer points out the absurdity in the Council's application of filtration: the regulations allocate the units
made available by filtration among the municipalities in proportion to the number
of multi-family units in each municipality. Wealthy suburbs, where extremely expensive homes constitute the entire housing market, are presumed to have low
income units made available by filtration, and this assumption decreases their fair
share obligations. See id. at 14-15.
79. N.J.A.C. § 5:92-7.1 (1987). Many potential sending municipalities delayed
filing with the Council or negotiating with poor communities for RCAs, or both,
in anticipation of the passage of this amendment. See Patterson, Trade-in Deals
Help to House the Poor, Star-Ledger (N.J.), May 4, 1987, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter
Patterson]. Thus, the possibility that the numbers would be reduced, like so many
other variables in the Mount Laurel saga, contributed to delays in construction.
80. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-323 (West 1987). Construction of low and
moderate income units in inclusionary developments may be phased in according
to the following schedule:
Court-Calculated Fair Share Obligation
Phase-in Period
2,000 or more low-to-moderate units
20 years
1,500-1,999 of low-to-moderate units
15 years
1,000-1,499 of low-to-moderate units
10 years
500-999 of low-to-moderate units
6 years
Less than 500 of low-to-moderate units
up to 6 years
See Rose, New Jersey Enacts a Fair Housing Law, 14 REAL EST. L.J. 195, 201
(1985) (outlining the guidelines as set out in § 23 of the Fair Housing Act) [hereinafter
Fair Housing].
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Municipalities may voluntarily submit a fair share housing plan
to the Council as well as an ordinance with which to implement
the plan in a "housing element."'" The housing element must demonstrate that it will create a realistic opportunity for the provision
of low and moderate income housing, using such techniques as
mandatory set-asides or density bonuses,8 2 infrastructure expansion
(if necessary), guarantees of continued affordability of the units to

81. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-309 (West 1987). The housing element should
include: (1) an inventory of the municipality's housing stock; (2) a six-year projection
of housing scheduled to be built in the municipality; (3) an analysis of the municipality's demographic characteristics; (4) an analysis of the employment opportunities in the community; (5) a determination of the municipality's present and
prospective fair share and its ability to accommodate its fair share; and (6) an
analysis of the developable real estate in the municipality, including existing structures
suitable for conversion. See id. § 52:27D-310.
The housing element works as an insurance policy for the municipality against
Mount Laurel litigation. After filing a housing element, a municipality may be
granted a six-year period of repose from Mount Laurel litigation by petitioning
either the Council for "substantive certification" of its element and zoning ordinances or the superior court for a declaratory judgment that its element and
ordinances are not exclusionary. See id. § 52:27D-313. "Substantive certification"
creates a presumption of validity of the housing element and zoning ordinances
that a plaintiff may overcome only by a showing of clear and convincing evidence
that the municipality's element and the ordinances designed to implement it are
exclusionary. See id. § 52:27D-317. Thus, as one commentator has noted, "the
Council's administrative process ... reverses the presumption ... of municipal

wrongdoing-one of the key features of Mount Laurel II-to a presumption in
favor of the certified zoning ordinance." McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation
in Exclusionary Zoning Law, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 636 (1987) [hereinafter Litigation to Legislation].

The Council will grant "substantive certification" if a housing element is found
to fulfill a municipality's Mount Laurel obligation, unless an objection to substantive
certification is filed with the Council within 45 days of publication of the municipality's petition. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-314 (West 1987).
The Act established a procedure for mediation by the Council if substantive
certification of a housing element is challenged, and review by the Office of
Administrative Law if the Council is unable to resolve the matter. See id. § 52:27D315. The Office of Administrative Law must issue its decision within 90 days of
transmittal of the case, and the Council makes the final determination on substantive
certification. Id.
A challenger of a substantive certification may appeal to the superior court only
after these administrative remedies have been exhausted. See Chall, supra note 53,
at 25. The Act also provides:
Any exclusionary zoning cases instituted after 60 days before the effective
date of the Act are automatically transferred to the jurisdiction of the
Council. Any such cases that were in the courts and still unresolved
prior to 60 days before the effective date of the Act were to be transferred
to the Council if the court found "no manifest injustice would result."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-316 (West 1987).
82. See supra note 59 for a definition of these terms.
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low income residents, and tax abatements and use of state or federal
subsidies for construction of low income units. s3
Under the Act, municipalities are not required to raise revenues
84
to fund the construction of low and moderate income housing.
The legislature designated state funds to subsidize the rehabilitation
and construction of low and moderate income housing under the
Act. s" The Act also directs the State Housing and Mortgage Finance
Agency to: (1) oversee the construction or rehabilitation of the low
income housing; (2) work with cities and developers to market the
units in inclusionary developments; and (3) determine tenant eligi86
bility, resale prices and rents.

83. See N.J. STAT. AN. § 52:27D-311.
84. Id. If a municipality misses the deadline established by the Council for the
filing of its housing element, its case is dismissed from the jurisdiction of the
Council. Those municipalities that give notification of their intent to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Council but fail to meet the deadline for filing of the housing
element lose the protection offered by the Act, and thus run the risk of exclusionary
zoning litigation.
As of January 5, 1987, only 91 municipalities had submitted to the jurisdiction
of the Council and had met their deadlines. January 5th COAH Deadline, Council
on Affordable Housing Newsletter 1 (Jan. 1987). As of January 5, 1987, 80% of
New Jersey's municipalities still had the option of voluntarily complying with the
Act. See SURENiAN, supra note 27, at 462.
It seems that only those municipalities that have been through the courts and
those that would have small fair share obligations are submitting to the jurisdiction
of the Council. In addition, many municipalities do not see themselves as threatened
by litigation.. Some argue that the low rate of compliance is attributable to the
Office of the Public Advocate challenging many housing elements as insufficient.
Therefore, municipalities run a risk of administrative hearings and, possibly, litigation based on their voluntary compliance. Telephone interview with Joanne Harkin,
New Jersey Builders' Association (Oct. 1, 1987).
85. See Fair Housing, supra note 80, at 201; see also Chall, supra note 53, at
26. Although Mount Laurel H ordered municipalities to take affirmative steps to
ease the financial burdens on developers of providing low income housing, the
court did not have the power to designate state funds for this purpose. In this
respect, the Fair Housing Act (the Act) surpasses the Mount Laurel doctrine in
its aid to development of low income housing.
The Act set aside $100 million in state Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency
(HMFA) bond revenues to be used for mortgage subsidies, $15 million from general
revenues to be used for various projects, and another $10 million ($2 million from
general revenues and $8 million from an increase in the realty transfer tax) to
fund various housing and infrastructure costs paid for by the Neighborhood Preservation Program. See Fair Housing, supra note 80, at 201; see also Chall, supra
note 53, at 26 (citing Governor Kean's conditional veto message of the bill originally
sent to him) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office). The realty transfer
tax was increased for the purpose of funding this program. See id. (citing 1985
N.J. Pub. Law, ch. 225).
86. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-304, -324 (West 1987); FairHousing, supra
note 80, at 201-02.
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Regional Contribution Agreements
The most radical difference between the Mount Laurel doctrine

and the Fair Housing Act is that the Act allows one municipalityusually a wealthy suburb-to pay another municipality-usually a
central city-to absorb half of the former's fair share.8 7 Sections 11

and 12 of the Act permit municipalities to enter into "regional
contribution agreements," under which one municipality may transfer
up to fifty percent of its fair share obligation to another municipality

within its housing region."
A municipality's plan to enter into a regional contribution agreement (RCA) must be submitted in its housing element and must
include: (1) the municipality's reasons for entering into an RCA;
(2) the agreement between the sending and receiving municipalities;

(3) the number of units to be transferred; and (4) an explanation
of both the compensation to be provided to the receiving municipality
by the sending municipality and the nature and source of the compensation. 9 The Council will approve by resolution. an RCA that

is "consistent with sound, comprehensive regional planning" and
"provides

a realistic opportunity for low and moderate income

housing within convenient access to employment opportunities. '" 90 A

87. See Chall, supra note 53, at 24; Fair Housing, supra note 80, at 199;

Litigation to Legislation, supra note 81, at 637; Passaro, Consider the Transfer
Option, 1986 NEW JERSEY MUNICIPALITIES 20, 20; SuRENIAN, supra note 27, at
553. See generally McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements: Compensation
for Exclusionary Zoning, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 665 (1987) [hereinafter Compensation for
Exclusionary Zoning].
88. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-311 to -312 (West 1987). The pre-veto bill
would have allowed the transfer of only up to one-third of a municipality's fair
share obligation. See Litigation to Legislation, supra note 81, at 638 n.101.
89. Transferring Housing Obligations via RCAs, Council on Affordable Housing
Newsletter 5 (Aug. 1986) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office). The
Council then forwards the RCA to the county planning board of the receiving
municipality to consider whether the RCA is in accordance with: (1) sound regional
planning; (2) the zoning ordinances of both the sending and receiving municipalities;
(3) the county plan; and (4) the State Development Guide Plan. The receiving
municipality must also submit the RCA plan to the HMFA for review. Finally, if
the sending municipality is a defendant in an exclusionary zoning case, the court,
in addition to the three agencies, must review the RCA. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:27D-312(b), (c) (West 1987); see also SURENIAN, supra note 27, at 556-59.
90. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312(c) (West 1987). The Act mandates that the
Council include in its resolution a schedule of contributions to be made annually
by the sending municipality. The Department of Community Affairs must receive
a copy of the resolution, and it will approve an annual budget of a sending
municipality only if the budget provides for the compensation set forth in the
resolution. See id. § 52:27D-312(d).
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municipality may not, however, transfer any of its indigenous need. 9'
The receiving municipality may provide lower income housing
pursuant to an RCA through: (1) new construction; (2) rehabilitation;
(3) conversion of existing housing; (4) conversion of structures previously used for nonresidential purposes; and (5) creation of alternative living arrangements such as boarding homes. 92 The receiving
municipality does not satisfy any portion of its own fair share
obligation by accepting units pursuant to an RCA. 93
The amount of compensation to be paid under an RCA is based
on "a weighted average of the costs of rehabilitation and new
construction. '94 The Act states that the compensation to be paid
by a sending municipality may include "an amount agreed upon to
compensate or partially compensate the receiving municipality for
infrastructure or other .costs generated to the receiving municipality
by the development." 91 The price does not, however, reflect other

91. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:92-6.1 (1987). As the Department of the Public
Advocate has pointed out, however, although the Act prohibits the use of RCAs
to reduce the proportion of the sending municipality's low income population, the
regulations do not insure against this potential abuse. See Eisdorfer, supra note
78, at 17-18.
92. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:92-11.2(b), (c); SURENIAN, supra note 27, at
560.
93. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:92-11.3; SURENIAN, supra note 27, at 560.
94. See Compensation for Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 87, at 686 n.158.
More specifically, this "weighted average" is based on an average of the median
amount required to rehabilitate low and moderate income units and the average
internal subsidization required for a developer to provide low and moderate income
units in an inclusionary development. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312(f) (West
1987); see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:92-11.5 (1987).
The Council's regulations estimate these costs as: (1) at least $10,000 to rehabilitate
a low or moderate income housing unit; (2) $12,500 to provide a moderate income
unit in an inclusionary development; and (3) $27,500 to provide a low income
housing unit in an inclusionary development. See id. § 5:92-11.5(b), (c) (1987); see
also SURENIAN, supra note 27, at 561. These recommended figures have been
interpreted as requiring a floor of $10,000 and suggesting, but not requiring, a
ceiling of $27,000 per unit. See, e.g., Compensationfor Exclusionary Zoning, supra
note 87, at 686 n.158.
The Council establishes the duration of the compensation, which may be prorated
in municipal appropriations over a period of up to six years. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:27D-312(f) (West 1987).
95. Id. " 'Infrastructure' refers to sewers, drainage, streets, parking areas, water
and power, among other things." Compensation for Exclusionary Zoning, supra
note 87, at 687 n.160.
There seems to be some confusion as to whether the Act intended to include
infrastructure costs in the amount to be paid by the sending municipality. Although
the language of the statute is relatively clear on this point, one commentator,
Professor McDougall, has noted the following:
As part of the agreement, the sending municipality compensates the
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considerations such as administrative costs to the receiving municipality of selecting tenants and buyers, costs of maintenance of rental
units, cost overruns in construction, 96 and the cost of increased social
services for any new residents transferred to a municipality as a
result of an RCA.
Perhaps the most significant characteristic of the RCA procedure
is that the sending and receiving municipalities are left alone to
negotiate a transfer unit price, subject to the approval of the Council. 97
In general, the municipality that is able to offer the lowest price
will receive the transferred housing. The Act and the Council's
regulations thus foster a bidding process among New Jersey's municipalities, with poor communities bidding against one another for
98
much needed housing.
There are two ways in which sending and receiving municipalities
find one another: either a poor municipality looks for wealthy
municipalities to provide housing for its residents, or a wealthy

receiving municipality in an amount equal to the equity costs the sending
municipality would have incurred had it been required to develop lowerincome housing units. Payments for infrastructure costs and other development costs are not included in equity costs and thus not required
by the Act.
Litigation to Legislation, supra note 81, at 637-38. But see Compensation for
Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 87, at 681 n.126 ("compensation may also include
an amount for other costs generated by the development, such as infrastructure
costs").

As Professor McDougall recognizes at another point, however, one of the failures
of the Act is that "costs of project administration associated with rental housing,
or costs of homeowner education and assistance associated with housing sold to
low income persons, are not included." Id.
96. See Compensation for Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 87, at 687.
97. See County Review Checklists for RCAs, Council On Affordable Housing
Newsletter 2 (Jan. 1987) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
98. See Patterson, supra note 79, at 15, col. 2. One commentator predicted a
"bidding war" among sending municipalities based on an assumption that the
demand among sending municipalities to transfer their fair share obligations would
exceed the supply of low income housing opportunities in receiving municipalities
in any given region. See SURENIAN, supra note 27, at 561. This commentator foresaw
a need for supervision of RCAs by the Council to prevent receiving municipalities
from abusing the process. He anticipated the possibility of receiving municipalities
obtaining from the sending municipalities compensation far in excess of the amounts
suggested by the regulations for the transferred units. Due to recent and severe
cutbacks in fair share obligations as a result of the 1987 amendment to the Act,
however, the competition is among the receivers, not the senders. See Patterson,
supra note 79, at 15. For a detailed discussion of the effect of the bidding process
on the goals of the Mount Laurel doctrine, see infra notes 133-39 and accompanying
text.
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municipality asks poor ones if they need housing. 99 In determining
a transfer unit price, the Council's regulations recommend consideration of: (1) the extent of infrastructure already in place at the
particular site within the receiving municipality; (2) the availability
of cheap land and structures as a result of tax foreclosures and so
forth; and (3) variations in labor costs and median incomes between
urban and suburban sites.' °°
Based on these criteria, the extent to which a community has
deteriorated has a tremendous impact on whether it will be a receiving
municipality under the RCA system. A municipality will be more
desirable as a receiving municipality if it has a strong infrastructure
in place that will be able to accommodate some of the new units,
or, at least, serve as a model for another site within the municipality.
Similarly, a community that has buildings suitable for rehabilitation
and conversion will be more attractive than a community that has
reached such a level of deterioration that the structures have either
been torn down or need to be torn down. It is generally less expensive
to renovate than to construct anew.10 '

99. Telephone interview with Sidna Mitchell, Public Information Officer, Council
on Affordable Housing (Oct. 1, 1987).
The Act states that the Council must maintain a list of municipalities that intend
to enter into RCAs as receiving municipalities. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D312(e) (West 1987).
100. See Compensation for Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 87, at 687 n.161.
"Rehabilitation of existing sound structures is ordinarily cheaper than new construction. Deteriorated structures, however, must be razed and cleared to make
way for new construction." Id.
101. See id. In addition, the infrastructure is likely to require less of an investment
to be brought into compliance with health regulations at a rehabilitation site than
at a site of new construction, where either no infrastructure exists or the old
infrastructure has greatly deteriorated.
The city of Orange was able to offer a price of $14,000 per renovated unit in
an RCA with Essex Fells. Newark, which would have had to construct new units,
quoted to Essex Fells a price of $20,000 to $24,000 per unit and consequently lost
to Orange in the deal. See Patterson, supra note 79, at 15, col. 1.
These estimates fall far below the costs of renovation and new construction in
other cities. The cost of renovating units in New York City under two different
programs has recently been estimated at $65,000 per unit. See Press Releases, The
City of New York, Office of Mayor Edward 1. Koch, Sept. 29, 1987 & Oct. 27,
1987. See generally DePalma, Tax Credits Produce Housing for the Poor, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1988, § 8, at 1, col. 1.
In February 1985, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
estimated that it would require an average of $26,000 per unit tO bring Boston
apartments back up to code standards under a renovation program. The actual
costs under this program have averaged $78,890 per unit. GREATER BOSTON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, INc., Case Study: The Boston Housing Partnership (Sept.
1987). This information suggests that New Jersey's cities are quoting unrealistically
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Mount Laurel III and Regional Contribution Agreements

In Hills Development Co. v. Bernards Township (Mount Laurel
1),102 the New Jersey Supreme Court found the Fair Housing Act
(the Act) to be constitutional. The court consolidated several challenges to the Act brought by public interest and developer plaintiffs
who feared that various provisions of the Act would further delay
or hinder the rezoning for which the plaintiffs had fought in the
earlier Mount Laurel decisions. 103 The court specifically upheld the
constitutionality of: (1) the Act's temporary moratorium on the
builder's remedy; (2) the delays in fulfillment of fair share obligations
that would result from the establishment of the Council; and (3)
the procedure for review of zoning ordinances, insofar as the procedure did not preclude ultimate judicial review. 1°4
Although the issue of RCAs was not specifically addressed in
Mount Laurel III, the court generally upheld the constitutionality
of all provisions of the Act. 1'° In a footnote, Justice Wilentz, writing
for the majority, expressed his approval of the treatment of RCAs
by the New Jersey Superior Court in Morris County Fair Housing
Council v. Boonton Township,106 which held, inter alia, that the

low prices to ensure receipt of the RCA money, which they may hope to use for
purposes other than construction of the particular development for which the money
was targeted.
For a discussion of the misuse of RCA funds, see infra notes 124-32 and
accompanying text.
102. 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986) [hereinafter Mount Laurel III].
103. See id. at 25, 510 A.2d at 634.
104. See id.at 40-45, 510 A.2d at 642-46.
105. See id.
106. 209 N.J. Super. 393, 507 A.2d 768 (Law Div. 1985). In Mount Laurel III,
Justice Wilentz surprisingly glossed over the legislative intent regarding RCAs without
mention of the Mount Laurel goals of economic and racial integration:
The provisions seem intended to allow suburban municipalities to transfer
a portion of their obligation (... evincing a legislative intent to encourage
construction, conversion, or rehabilitation of housing in urban areas),
thereby aiding in the construction of decent lower income housing in
the area where most lower income households are found, provided,
however, that such areas are "within convenient access to employment
opportunities," and conform to "sound comprehensive regional planning."
Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 38, 510 A.2d at 641.
In Mount Laurel II, Justice Wilentz had ordered the provision of low and
moderate income housing in municipalities that had previously excluded the poor.
In Mount Laurel III, however, it seems he compromised his Mount Laurel II

position. Justice Wilentz, like Judge Skillman in Morris County, see infra note
107, apparently accepted the political reality that led to the enactment of the RCA
provisions themselves; while residents of higher income suburbs would fight to
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RCA provisions of the Act were constitutional as enacted.10 7
While Mount Laurel III and Morris County upheld the RCA

provisions as facially constitutional, neither case precludes challenges
to implementation of the provisions by the Council.108 The RCA

exclude people of low income from their borders, they would be less likely to
object to bearing the cost of this housing, through higher rents and purchase prices
charged by developers, if the lower income housing were built elsewhere. The RCAs,
by permitting up to 50% of a municipality's fair share to be transferred away,
would greatly increase the likelihood that the housing would actually be provided.
Judge Skillman, however, did not grapple with the overall effect of the implementation of RCAs on the broader goals of the Mount Laurel doctrine.
107. Morris County, 209 N.J. Super. at 435, 507 A.2d at 791.
108. In Morris County, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of the RCA provisions
as inconsistent with the Mount Laurel II mandate which provided that " 'if sound
planning of an area allows the rich and middle class to live there, it must also
realistically and practically allow the poor.' " Morris County, 209 N.J. Super. at
431, 507 A.2d at 789 (citing Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 211, 456 A.2d at 416).
The Morris County court rejected the plaintiffs' position on three grounds.
First, the Fair Housing Act limits the transfer of a municipality's fair share
obligation to a maximum of 50%. The court argued that, insofar as the balance
of the housing must still be constructed within the borders of the transferring
municipality, "it does not permit a municipality to remain solely an enclave for
the rich and middle class." Morris County, 209 N.J. Super. at 431, 507 A.2d at
789. However, in conjunction with the 1,000-unit ceiling on fair share obligations
imposed by the Council, the RCA provision guarantees that communities with few
indigenous poor will have to provide no more than 500 low income units. Thus,
the amount of integration that will result under the Act may be even smaller than
that envisioned by the Morris County court.
Second, the Morris County court argued that the possibility of such transfer
agreements had not been specifically rejected in either Mount Laurel I or Mount
Laurel I. In support of his contention that RCAs did not contradict the Mount
Laurel doctrine, Judge Skillman cited language from Mount Laurel I in which the
court stated that sound planning may require transfer agreements among municipalities. Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 189, 336 A.2d at 713, cited in Morris County,
209 N.J. Super. at 431, 507 A.2d at 789 (emphasis added). In language not cited
by Judge Skillman, Mount Laurel I also states that the use of such transfer
agreements would be limited to situations where necessary "because of greater
availability of suitable land, location of employment, accessibility of public transportation or some other significant reason." Id. Under current Council procedures,
as long as the Council determines that an RCA provides a "realistic opportunity
for low and moderate income housing within convenient access to employment
opportunites," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312(c) (West 1987), a municipality's
motivation for the transfer will evidently not be questioned. In light of the stated
intention in Mount Laurel I to eradicate exclusionary zoning, however, it is not
clear that Judge Skillman intended to support the current Council procedure, which
would allow RCAs whose sole "significant" purpose is the exportation of as much
of a municipality's low income housing obligation as possible.
Finally, Judge Skillman upheld the RCA provisions on the assumption that the
Council would "exercise [its] approval power in a manner which appropriately
implements the objectives of the Mount Laurel doctrine." Morris County, 209 N.J.
Super. at 432, 507 A.2d at 790. Thus, RCAs could still be found unconstitutional
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provisions, if insufficiently monitored by the Council, greatly increase
the possibility that fair share obligations will be fulfilled without
achieving any of the racial and economic integration implicitly espoused by the Mount Laurel decisions, and without achieving Mount
Laurel's goal of revitalizing urban areas.
III.

Race Discrimination and the Mount Laurel Doctrine

The Mount Laurel doctrine does not directly focus on race as a
factor in exclusionary zoning.'09 Nonetheless, the goal of racial integration through the eradication of exclusionary zoning is implicit
in Justice Pashman's comments in Mount Laurel P10 and in the
Mount Laurel II holding."'
Given the extent to which minorities are represented among New
Jersey's low income population, it is difficult to imagine that the
Mount Laurel II court intended the economic desegregation it espoused to benefit exclusively low income whites. The Mount Laurel
II court sought the "deconcentration of the urban poor." 2 According to the New Jersey 1980 Census Counts of Population by
Race and Spanish Origin, over seventy-five percent of New Jersey's
black population resided in the forty-two urban aid municipalities,
as compared with twenty-seven percent of New Jersey's white population." 3 As one commentator has noted, approximately twice as
many white as black families living in these municipalities qualified
as low income under the Mount Laurel II means test, and nearly
three times as many white as black families qualified for moderate
income housing under the Mount Laurel I.

l

4
1

Thus, low income

if the Council did not follow the objectives of the Mount Laurel doctrine in its
implementation of RCAs. Given the limited purposes for which the Mount Laurel
I court envisioned the need for transfer agreements, the RCAs, as implemented,
fail to advance important objectives of the Mount Laurel doctrine that survived
the Mount Laurel III decision.
109. See supra notes 41-42, 72-73 and accompanying text. See generally Holmes,
A Black Perspective on Mount Laurel II: Toward a Black "Fair Share", 14 SETON
HALL L. REV. 944 (1984) (doctrine's failure to isolate race as a major cause of
exclusionary zoning allows the possibility that the Mount Laurel mandate could be
fulfilled without housing a single black family) [hereinafter Holmes].
110. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Board of Education, 675 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). But cf. note 106 (Mount
Laurel III does not address goals of economic and racial integration).
112. See Holmes, supra note 109, at 950.
113. Id. at 949 (citing STATE DATA CENTER, NEW JERSEY CENSUS OF POPULATION
BY RACE AND SPANISH ORIGIN

114. See id. at 950-51.

(Mar. 1981)).
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black families would be entitled to one-third of the new housing
units created pursuant to Mount Laurel II, and similarly, moderate
income black families would be entitled to roughly one-fourth of
the units.' 5
Although this commentator used these figures to illustrate the
possibility that "selection criteria left unmonitored could result in
apparent significant success for the Mount Laurel mandate without
accommodating a single black family,""116 it seems highly unlikely
that the court, aware of the concentration of blacks in the cities,
intended a racially segregated approach to deconcentration of the
urban poor.
Although buried in a footnote, the Mount Laurel II court's reference to the relationship between exclusionary zoning and the oppression of racial minorities in American society is indicative of the
unspoken theme underlying Mount Laurel II." 7 It is difficult to
imagine that the court would go to such lengths to destroy exclusionary zoning in New Jersey without some desire to alleviate the
racial pocketing that existed in the state as of 1980. While the Mount
Laurel mandate might have been clearer if the court had specifically
addressed the race issue, in light of the demographics of New Jersey"'
there is no need to do so. It is implicit that a measure of racial
integration was intended in the court's holding.
By upholding the constitutionality of RCAs, the Mount Laurel
III court retreated somewhat from the integration goals of Mount
Laurel II. RCAs allow a municipality to trade away up to fifty
percent of its fair share obligation, and thus, reduce the potential
for racial and economic integration of New Jersey's suburbs. The
Mount Laurel III court pointed out, however, that since the balance
of the housing must still be constructed within the transferring
municipality, RCAs do not "permit a municipality to remain solely
an enclave for the rich and middle class."" 9 This stance evidences
the New Jersey Supreme Court's continued support of at least limited
economic and racial integration of New Jersey's wealthier municipalities.

115. See id.
116. Id. at 950.
117. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 113 and accompanying text; see also Holmes, supra note
109, at 949-50 (survey of New Jersey demographics).
119. See Morris County, 209 N.J. Super. at 431, 507 A.2d at 789.
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Abuses of the RCA System: The Selling Out of the Mount
Laurel Vision

New Jersey's Fair Housing Act (the Act) adopts the Mount Laurel
policy of providing housing for people of low and moderate income,
but, with the RCA provision, it compromises the goal of the eradication of exclusionary zoning. The Act preserves the redistributive
policy espoused by the Mount Laurel courts by requiring exclusionary
municipalities to pay for the housing burdens they create in other
communities. The Act, however, restricts Mount Laurel's implicit
goal of racial integration. Even though it will help to rebuild some
poor communities and may, thereby, promote the return to the cities
of some industries that fled urban decay, the Act and the Council's
1000-unit ceiling abandons the Mount Laurel vision of a more
integrated society. In addition, the present system of implementation
offers no guarantee that the funds transferred under an RCA will
be used to house low income residents in need of such housing, or
that these funds will help to revitalize New Jersey's urban areas.
A.

RCAs and Racial Segregation

Although they failed to focus specifically on the importance of
race in the exclusionary zoning equation, the Mount Laurel courts,
in fashioning a remedy for economic segregation in New Jersey,
understood that implicit in their remedy was a measure of racial
desegregation as well. 120 Insofar as minorities constitute a large portion of New Jersey's low income inner-city population, economic
integration requires a certain amount of racial integration, unless
21
racial discrimination skews the process.'
By allowing suburban municipalities to pay cities to take half of
their fair share obligation, the RCA program in conjunction with
the 1000-unit ceiling on fair share obligations, compromises the
Mount Laurel mandate that municipalities can not exclude poor
people. Moreover, while the Act prohibits municipalities from trading
away the portion of their fair share that represents indigenous need,
122
the Council's regulations fail to enforce this aspect of the Act.
Because of this 1000-unit ceiling on fair share obligation, indigenous need will represent a larger percentage of many municipalities'
fair shares. The Act, as it has 6een implemented, thus eschews the

120. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
121. See id.
122. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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Mount Laurel goal of integration by allowing a suburb both to
exclude low income outsiders and, due to the failure of the regulations
to insure against this potential deviation from the mandate of the
Act, to expel a portion of the low income families currently residing

within its borders.

123

123. See infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text. This criticism of the Act
can not effectively be advanced without addressing the question of whether the
integration sought by the Mount Laurel courts would benefit low income minorities,
as the courts assumed with little analysis. See Revitalizing City, supra note 46, at
677.
One of the Mount Laurel arguments for deconcentration of the urban poor was
based on the assumption that allowing low income people to live in the suburbs
would facilitate their access to jobs for which they were qualified. See Mount
Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 172, 336 A.2d at 723 ("[o]ne incongruous result [of exclusionary
land use regulations] is the picture of developing municipalities rendering it impossible
for lower paid employees of industries they have eagerly sought and welcomed
with open arms . . . to live in the community where they work"); see also Mount

Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 210 n.5, 456 A.2d at 415 n.5 ("[tihe provision of lower
income housing in the suburbs ...

may- also make jobs more accessible for the

unemployed poor"). This assumption has been criticized as ignoring the difficulties
the poor could expect to encounter in the suburban job market:
Apparently, the court failed to take into consideration the fact that the
obvious problems hindering the urban poor when they seek inner city
jobs, including race and sex discrimination, single parent households and
poor education and vocational training, will be exacerbated at the affluent
suburban level. It is doubtful that there are enough jobs in the suburbs
for which inner city people are qualified; some .

.

. come from families

where unemployment is in its second generation.
Revitalizing City, supra note 46, at 677. Life in the suburbs could present other
financial burdens for relocated poor such as the need for a car and increases in
the costs of necessities such as heating, clothing and groceries. Id.
Furthermore, the racial discrimination that kept the minority poor out of the
suburbs will not disappear when these minorities are moved into the suburbs, at
least not at the outset. Arguing in the context of school desegregation, Professor
Derrick Bell has noted the following:
White resistance to integrated schools is the same as white resistance to
fair employment opportunities for blacks, or to black representation on
school boards or jury panels, or black residents in the house next door.
The principle is supported, but the practice is avoided and, when necessary,
opposed. The North favored school desegregation as long as it occurred
in the South. Decent housing for blacks is a worthwhile goal, except in
the suburbs where its presence may threaten the affluent white environment.
Bell, Integration: A No Win Policy for Blacks?, 11 INEQUALITY IN EDUC. 35, 37
(1972) [hereinafter Bell].
The detrimental effects that school desegregation has had on the black community,
such as the firing and demoting of black school teachers and administrators,
segregation of classes, suspensions and expulsions of black students and psychological
damage to black students as a result of racist actions, have their corollaries in the
housing integration context. See, e.g., Bell, The Burden of Brown on Blacks:
History-Based Observations on a Landmark Decision, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 25, 29,
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36 (1975). Professor Bell supports the creation of model all-black schools as an
alternative means of achieving an "equal educational opportunity." Id. at 36-38.
Professor Bell does not argue for the complete abandonment of school desegregation.
Rather, he argues that where blacks are unable to achieve in schools to which they
are bused, the model all-black school alternative should be available. Professor
Bell does support the ideal, albeit difficult to attain, of the "truly integrated
school," that is, one which offers an equal opportunity to minorities. Id.
One could argue by analogy that the money used to build Mount Laurel housing
in the suburbs would be better spent constructing model inner city housing developments. Providing the poor with affordable housing in such developments would
improve their living standards and, as a result, expand their opportunities to advance
economically, perhaps to a stage from which they would be able to move to the
suburbs if they should choose to do so.
Central to Professor Bell's criticism of the school desegregation paradigm is that
busing is "the only realistic means of desegregating schools given neighborhood
patterns in much of the country." Id. at 26 n.4. Busing as a means of desegregation
creates an unrealistic environment for minority children because it places them in
a situation that does not mirror the world around them. See Bell, supra, at 4041. Similarly, the white communities into which the minority students are bused
have limited exposure to these other racial groups beyond the school context.
In sharp contrast to the busing paradigm criticized by Professor Bell, the Mount
Laurel doctrine envisions the desegregation of society on a grander scale. As a
practical matter, it is easier for whites to withdraw their children from the public
schools and to pressure local school boards to discriminate against bused students
than it is for them to move to other suburbs when minorities move in. This notion
is reinforced by the fact that effective Mount Laurel II implementation would place
at least some minorities in most of New Jersey's suburbs, so there would be few,
if any, suburbs in New Jersey to which minority-fearing whites could flee.
Under the Mount Laurel ideal, minorities and whites would eventually be forced
to deal with one another in all aspects of their lives and, hopefully, the prejudices
fueling discriminatory treatment of low income minorities would break down. As
a consequence, equal opportunities for the minority poor would become realistically
available. The view that integrated housing patterns would alleviate racial discrimination and improve the status of minorities is, of course, not unique to the Mount
Laurel court. See, e.g., Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122,
1134 (2d Cir. 1973) (housing authority's duty to integrate housing projects derived
from 1968 Fair Housing Act goals of integrated housing and prevention of segregation).
Speaking of the racially motivated killing of a black man in the all-white
neighborhood of Howard Beach in Queens, New York, Mayor Sharpe James of
Newark stated: "As long as we allow segregated neighborhoods and schools to
exist, we are allowing racism to exist as well. This should be a challenge to
government, which controls housing development ... ." Three Guilty, One Cleared
in the Howard Beach Case, Star Ledger (N.J.), Dec. 22, 1987, at 1, col. 6. Insofar
as the burden of this forced integration would fall primarily on minorities in that
they would be transplanted to potentially hostile suburbs, the Council should develop
a system whereby qualified low and moderate income minorities may choose between
housing provided in the communities where they currently reside and housing
provided in the suburbs. Such a system would allow the minorities to decide for
themselves whether to opt for the Mount Laurel integrated community or the model
inner city communities suggested by Professors Bell and McDougall.
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Another possible abuse of the RCA system lies in the use of the
transfer unit compensation by the receiving municipality. Under the
current system, the state Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency
(HMFA) monitors the RCA process to ensure that the compensation
received by transferee municipalities is used to build the housing
intended for the transferor municipalities. 24 There is currently a
movement, however, to limit the power of the HMFA in the RCA
process.12 5 Municipalities that receive housing under RCAs are in
need of money for many reasons. The funds from one RCA may
be used to supplement the cost of another RCA development for
which the municipality, unable to offer a bona fide price that would
beat the competition, bid too low a price. Compensation from one
RCA could be used to meet the costs of an earlier RCA project
that were not included in the transfer unit price in the earlier
126
agreement.
Assuming less good faith on the part of receiving municipalities,
one commentator has suggested that these municipalities could "clear
out their lower income, service-needy population and use RCA funds
to build infrastructure to attract business and the middle class. ' 127
Such displacement of the poor has occurred in the past as a result
of "urban renewal' '1 28 and gentrification,' 29 which are similar to
exclusionary zoning in that they are expulsionary.' 30 The RCA funds
could be used either to foster the return of businesses to the cities' 3'
or to augment the gentrification that is already taking place in many
of New Jersey's cities.'
124. Telephone interview with Richard Shapiro, New Jersey Department of the
Public Advocate (Jan. 14, 1988).
125. See id.
126. For a discussion of costs not covered by the RCA program, see supra notes
94-96 and accompanying text.

127. Compensation for Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 87, at 690. Professor

McDougall's pessimistic approach derives from his extensive observations of cities'
behavior. See, e.g., Revitalizing City, supra note 46, at 670-75.
128. See, e.g., Compensation for Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 87, at 690
n.181 (citing Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1968)), where a municipality was charged with using urban renewal to displace the
poor and minorities).
129. See generally Revitalizing City, supra note 46, at 648-84; Compensation for
Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 87, at 683-84.
130. "Urban renewal is in some ways the mirror image of exclusionary zoning
....
Instead of excluding the poor, the objective is to expel them." Compensation
for Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 87, at 690 n.183 (citations omitted).
131. Id.
132. New Jersey's. cities have been experiencing gentrification since the early
1980's. For a discussion of the gentrification of Jersey City and Trenton, see
Revitalizing City, supra note 46, at 678-83.
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Insofar as the first regional contribution agreement was not given
final approval by the Council until March 7, 1988, it is still too
early to determine whether these abuses of the program will, in
fact, occur. Nonetheless, if the movement to limit the review of the
HMFA is successful, the compensation received under RCAs could
be used to hurt the very people who the Mount Laurel doctrine
sought to benefit. Rather than restrict the powers of the Council
and the HMFA to govern the use of the RCA compensation, efforts
should be made to enhance these powers so as to guarantee proper
allocation of the funds that have their source, ultimately, in the
Mount Laurel doctrine.
C. The Unregulated Bidding Process: Competition Among the
Needy
As a result of the unregulated bidding procedure for RCAs, 133
municipalities undergoing gentrification are the favored recipients of
wealthy municipalities' fair share because the former can bid lower
transfer unit prices than other needy municipalities. 3 4 Communities
experiencing gentrification have buildings available for renovation
and their infrastructures are reinforced to accommodate the marketrate tenants and buyers.' 35 Insofar as the recently imposed 1,000unit cap on fair share obligations represents a substantial decrease
in the total number of low income housing units to be built in New
Jersey, it is conceivable that those municipalities most in need of
the housing will not benefit significantly from the Fair Housing Act
because the extent of deterioration in these communities has driven
up their housing costs.
The focus of the RCA process is on the ability of the sending
municipality to get rid of half of its share, rather than the need of
the receiving municipalities to get the housing. Although the RCAs
benefit poor municipalities in New Jersey (because they enable housing to be built for the poor), it is the sending, not the receiving,

133. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Patterson, supra
note 79, at 15, col. 1. "Several needy towns have discovered they are likely to
lose out to cities perceived as 'hot,' like Jersey City, or at least on the way upand experienced in rehabilitating buildings." Id.
135. Frank Nero, Director of New Brunswick's Office of Economic Development,
.believes his town's "ability to perform" explains its success rate in the bidding
for RCAs. "We have really served as a model for a lot of communities. We can
give towns something that is real, not something that is make believe." See Patterson,
supra note 79, at 15, col. 1.
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municipalities that wield all the bargaining power. 13 6 The way in
which the transfer credit prices are determined-without taking into
consideration several factors such as the administrative costs to the
receiving municipality, 3 7 and without subsidizing to equalize variations in the cost of providing housing at different sites-has left
the power to determine where the housing is built with the wealthy
municipalities.
As a consequence, the Council's regulations fail to ensure that
the transferred housing will be spread out among needy communities.
Moreover, although there is a 1000-unit cap on the fair share obligation, and a fifty-percent cap on the amount that can be transferred, there is no cap on the amount that one municipality may
receive under an RCA.3 8 It seems possible that, unless the RCA
program is more tightly regulated and monitored, communities undergoing gentrification could receive most, if not all, of the transferred units. Thus, the RCA program would do little to revitalize
areas experiencing urban decay.

136. See generally Compensation for Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 87, at 690

(RCAs should be more closely regulated to protect the poor because, due to their
unequal bargaining position, "cities may accept less compensation than is required
to provide affordable housing for their indigenous poor and the 'transferred' poor
combined").
Professor McDougall's argument regarding inequality of bargaining power is
potent, but he is incorrect in one of his assumptions about the RCAs. Under an
RCA, a housing burden is transferred to an area that has a greater housing need
and whose fair share obligation is limited by the Act due to the magnitude of the
housing crisis in that area. Receiving municipalities want the transferred units to
house their own poor. Professor McDougall discusses "transferred poor" and
describes the phenomenon of the "cities' acceptance of more indigent residents
without sufficient funds to house them." Id. at 683. Although it is true that
municipalities may accept less money than would be required to provide the transferred housing, receiving municipalities are not being forced to accept more low
income residents under RCAs. Pure enforcement of the Mount Laurel doctrine
would require transferring people from the cities to the suburbs because much of
the regional need, which determines a suburb's fair share, is generated by the
housing crisis in the cities. By contrast, the RCAs designate the housing to be
provided at the sites from which the regional need figures originate.
137. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
138. Susan Oxford, Assistant Deputy Public Advocate for the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, offers the following explanation:
"[Ilf the RCA involves rehabilitation, the Council will examine the
receiving community's housing stock to be sure there are sufficient substandard units occupied by income-qualified households. If the RCA
involves new construction, however, there is no restriction on the number
of units that a receiving community may agree to construct."
Letter to the Author from Susan Oxford, Assistant Deputy Public Advocate, New
Jersey Department of the Public Advocate (Feb. 5, 1988) (emphasis in original).
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To avoid the problem of the gentrified communities receiving all
of the RCA housing, the Council or the HMFA or both should be
empowered to ensure that housing is transferred in amounts proportionate to the need of the various receiving municipalities. Either
the bidding process should be eliminated by creating uniformity in
the cost of the transferred units incurred by the sending municipality,
or the site of the transferred units should be determined by lottery. 3 9
One method of bringing about uniformity of cost would be to
have the state set a fixed per-unit price that a municipality must
pay under an RCA for any transferred low or moderate income
unit. The per-unit price could be based on the average cost to supply
such units throughout the state. When a municipality chooses to
transfer some of its fair share obligation, it would pay an amount
equal to the number of units it wishes to transfer multiplied by the
fixed transfer unit price into a state trust fund. The trust fund
would then be distributed by the Council to the receiving municipalities in amounts proportionate to the size of their housing need
relative to other receiving municipalities and in amounts sufficient
to cover the costs of construction or renovation of transferred units
at the various sites.
Another method of equalizing the bidding power of the receiving
municipalities would be to provide subsidies in order to create uniformity of cost for the construction and renovation of units.' 40 Once
all communities have determined their transfer unit costs, those
communities where it will be more expensive to provide the housing
will have their transferred developments subsidized so that the cost
to the sending municipality will be the same for each low and each
moderate income unit transferred, regardless of the site to which it
is transferred.
Still another possibility is that the Council could match sending
and receiving municipalities, so that one would be required, if it
139. Cf. Compensation for Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 87, at 694 (maintaining that a "pigovian tax," the primary purpose of which would be to correct

inequalities of bargaining power between suburbs and cities, "might help to overcome
some of the regional differentiation which hinders the effective use of Regional
Contribution Agreements").
140. The subsidies could be raised either by increasing real estate taxes or by
requiring developers to deposit funds into a state trust fund that would represent
the difference between the developer's actual cost of providing a transferred unit
and the average cost of providing low income units in the state. The obvious
difficulty with this approach is that it would be nearly impossible to enforce honesty
on the part of developers in reporting the actual cost of the construction or
renovations, because the higher the quoted price, the less the developer would have
to pay into the trust fund.
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entered into an RCA, to do so with its assigned municipality. This
technique would eliminate the bidding process, but create a windfall
for the sending municipality that is matched with a community where
it will be less expensive to build housing. There would have to be
some method of matching the most desirable location for upper
income development with the least desirable location for low income
development, so that the municipality that reaps the greatest benefit
from new development pays more to provide low income housing.
Insofar as it would be the developers that would stand to gain
the most from the new development, developers would provide, as
they do under the present RCA system, the funding for the low
income housing. As a practical and political matter, however, this
procedure would be unenforceable. There are too many variables in
determining the most and least expensive places to build before the
start of the bidding process, and it is almost a certainty, based on
the history of the Mount Laurel doctrine, that litigation and administrative proceedings would keep the housing from getting built.
Perhaps the most effective and viable method of spreading out
the transferred units would be to select receiving municipalities by
lottery. Municipalities wanting to send or receive housing would
notify the Council, as they do under the present system, and the
Council would match the municipalities by lottery, making sure to
distribute the limited amount of housing proportionately, based on
need, among the receiving municipalities.
V.

Conclusion

Insofar as the Fair Housing Act facilitates the construction of
housing for New Jersey's low income population, the Act furthers
an important goal of Mount Laurel. Clearly, however, because it
abandons the goals of economic and racial deconcentration, the Act
can no longer be described as a codification of the Mount Laurel
doctrine. Substantial revisions are required to harmonize the Fair
Housing Act as currently implemented with the Mount Laurel vision.

